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a b s t r a c t
In light of the significant changes being observed in the US space industry, in terms of the increase share
of commercial launches, the development of inland spaceports, and the emergence of new vehicle
designs and propulsion systems, there is need to reassess launch safety. In this paper, several issues
related to space launch safety are reviewed, one in particular being the use, as the main the safety metric,
of the mean collective risk to the general public, also known as the expectation of casualties. A new, deci-
sion level, information-fusion-based metric is proposed, and through a detailed case study, its merit in
terms of the quality and quantity of information it generates is illustrated. The need for a new metric
is here advocated as a critical first step toward the necessary transition from a risk avoidance philosophy
to space launch safety to a risk management philosophy.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The 50 year old US space industry is undergoing significant
changes on a number of fronts. First, its activities are now increas-
ingly being driven by commercial launches rather than federal gov-
ernment launches. Second, the growing interest from some federal
states in owning spaceports is opening a new era with the future
development of inland launch sites. This is a significant departure
from federal spaceports – such as Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in
Florida (known as the Eastern Range, ER), Vandenberg Air Force
Base in California (known as the Western Range, WR) or Wallops
Flight Facility in Wallops Island, Virginia – which are located on
coastal areas with launch routes over the oceans, thereby limiting
over land flights. Third, the designs of new expandable and reus-
able launch vehicles (ELVs and RLVs) from private manufacturers
on one hand, and ongoing advances in new propulsion technolo-
gies [1] on the other, are calling for new launch systems certifica-
tion procedures. Indeed, the significant activities from federal
states and the private sector have led the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) to open the Office of Commercial Space Transporta-
tion as a regulatory agency [2].
However, from a safety standpoint, the loss of two of the five
Space Shuttles during both the launch and the return phases of
flights has raised public awareness on the safety issues related to
space launches. In addition, the launch safety standard procedures,
and the launch risk metric currently in use, as dictated and defined
by the Eastern and Western (EWR) 127-1 safety standard docu-
ment [3], are increasingly being criticized for their complexity
and philosophy. In fact, they promote a risk avoidance rather than
a risk management philosophy to safety [4]. In light of future in-
land spaceports, where flight over populated areas cannot be
avoided, such risk avoidance approach may potentially drive space
launch operation costs even higher, precisely at a time when re-
duced costs are actively sought after. Therefore, as a major compo-
nent of total launch cost, and being the obvious factor in public
safety, there is an urgent need to rethink launch safety in general,
in a way that would render space launches less cost-prohibitive,
while at the same time maintain current public safety levels.
Rethinking launch safety involves many areas, one of which
being the quality of the metric being used to assess it. In this paper,
we first provide a brief description of the EWR 127-1, including the
expectation of casualties EC –also known as the mean collective
risk – its main safety metric, and review the literature on outstand-
ing issues related to this document. The inadequacy of EC is then
fully exposed, justifying the need for a different safety metric for
space launch risk analysis. An information-fusion based safety
metric is then proposed. The value of this new metric, and how it
is calculated, is then illustrated through a detailed case study sim-
ulating the launch of a Space Shuttle from an inland spaceport. The
belief is that the form of this metric, while being more informative,
is also more intuitive than EC, thereby facilitating communication
of launch risk to chief safety officers, launch managers and, ulti-
mately, the general public. The authors hope that this paper on
an improved method of estimating the rocket launch mission risk,
could be of interest to different groups of professionals such as the
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mission safety specialists, the launcher agencies, the data process-
ing specialists, the launch risk policy analysts and the top manage-
ment decision makers for launches.
1.1. Background on the EWR 127-1 document and the mean
collective risk
The EWR 127-1 is a large, seven chapters, detailed document
developed by the 45th Space Wing (Cape Canaveral Air Station,
FL) and the 30th Space Wing (Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA). It
is intended to provide users of the ER and the WR (from this point
referred to as the ranges) with a common set of system, flight and
ground safety requirements. The steps by steps requirements seek
to minimize risks of loss of mission and of property damage, and
prevent the personnel and public from being exposed to risks great-
er than those considered acceptable by public law and state docu-
ments [3]. The full document can be accessed here [5].
The main safety metric used by the ranges is the mean collective
risk to the general public, also known as the expectation of casual-
ties EC. The EWR 127-1 dictates that this value should be less than
30  106. In other words, at most one serious injury or fatality (a
casualty) should be expected every 33,000 launches. For a launch
rate of 33 per year, this threshold can be interpreted as expecting
1 casualty every 1000 years. Both ranges have outstanding safety
records, as nomember of the general public or the launch site work-
force has ever been killed as a result of a launch from these sites.
However, in the year 2000, a study completed by the committee
on Space Launch Range Safety [4], at the request of the Air Force
Space Command, identified significant issues with the EWR 127-
1, two of which are mentioned here. The first relates to how a
range user should achieve the threshold EC requirement. The com-
mittee observed that the EWR 127-1 is focused more on methods
and solutions than on basic, performance-based safety require-
ments [4]. To paraphrase, the study indicates that although the
EWR 127-1 sets a safety threshold, no allowable component- or
system-level risk assessment is provided. This has led to the de fac-
to guiding principle of ‘‘achieve the highest system reliability”. The
second issue relates to the poor usability of the EWR 127-1. The
severity of this issue is to the point that essentially a new version
of this document is generated for each new launch system, a phe-
nomenon known as tailoring. The committee pointed that such
practices led to potential inconsistencies, leading among others
to different certification costs between users for identical equip-
ments [4].
2. Hazard modeling and issues with mean collective risk
The mean collective risk is calculated by estimating the effect of
one or all of the three main hazards produced by all launch vehicles
currently in service. During a vehicle breakup – whether accidental
or instructed by a safety officer – a large amount of fragments is
generated. The vehicle may also release, depending on the phase
of flight, a large amount of toxicant from its propellant. This release
may be in the form of burning propellant fragments that continue
to burn upon reaching the ground [6]. The overpressures from
explosion blasts constitute the third hazard. Blasts may be the
source of the vehicle breakup and/or may be produced from the
impact of the burning propellant fragments mentioned above with
the ground. In addition to those hazards’ effects, calculations of the
mean collective risk involve estimation of the probability of failure
of the vehicle as a function of the phase of flight, and estimation of
the geographic distribution and sheltering of the public. The gen-
eral formulation for the expectation of casualties (for any given
hazard) is as follows:
EC ¼ EPH  PC=E  PE ð1Þ
where EC is the expected casualties, EPH is the expected population
hazarded (or the number of people expected to be casualties), PC/E is
the probability of having a casualty following the breakup of a vehi-
cle, and PE is the probability that the breakup will occur. Expectedly,
the computation of EC is very complex.
2.1. The problematic of estimating the mean collective risk
Detailed specification of the vehicle failure modes and their
associated probabilities of failures are problematic given, on one
hand, the absence of a large amount of historical data, and on
the other the sheer complexity of launch systems. Fault trees of
NASA’s Space Shuttle [7,8] and detailed information on US launch
systems reliability over the past 50 years [9] can be found in the
literature.
Modeling of public exposure is also a complex task. Factors such
as population demographics and geographical distributions, or lev-
els of sheltering are all important in assessing the degree of expo-
sure. Pubic exposure is specific to the hazard being considered.
Tools that are developed to model exposure to debris [10] are not
suitable for assessing exposure to toxic gases or to explosions blasts.
In addition, when it comes to the hazards themselves, the modeling
and analyses techniques aimed at estimating their spatio-temporal
impact footprints are generally conservative because of the great
amount of uncertainties surrounding most of the contributing vari-
ables [4], such as fragments’ ballistic characteristics, winds
strengths and directions, and other meteorological conditions.
2.2. Merit of the mean collective risk as a safety metric
From the discussion above, it results from current practices that
the best estimate of the mean collective risk can only be sur-
rounded with a great amount of uncertainty, thereby severely
impacting its value as a safety metric. Indeed, some [11] have sta-
ted that a confident decision on the course of actions to be taken
(launch, abort, destruct, etc.) can only be made if the computed risk
is well above or below the safety threshold, in such a way that the
uncertainty associated with it will have no impact on the decision.
The value of EC as a safety metric is undermined further in the pres-
ence of more than one hazard. For ELVs, this may occur for break-
ups early in the launch phase, while some RLVs may generate these
hazards at any phase of their flights. In such cases, the overall col-
lective risk as specified in the EWR 127-1 is the sum of the individ-
ual risks [12]. In other words, the assumption being made is that
the overall risk is an independent combination of the individual
risks generated by each hazard. Given that the non-congruent im-
pact areas of the three hazards will often have some degree of
overlap, an independent combination of their risks could result
in an individual being counted more than once as a casualty. This
is clearly a very conservative approach, one that reflects the risk
avoidance philosophy of the EWR 127-1, and handicaps the growth
of the US space industry, as it overly restricts operations.
3. Formulation of a fusion based safety metric
Of the issues related to the value of EC as described above, infor-
mation fusion theory may be used to address the problematic of
the uncertainty surrounding the mean, and the assumption of
independence. The logic we propose follows. Concerning the
uncertainty surrounding the mean, instead of focusing on a mean
value whose uncertainty may be overly inflated by the assumption
of independence, we suggest that the focus be on building a confi-
dence around the probability of exceeding a predetermined safety
threshold. Indeed, truly what should be of interest from a safety
standpoint is the risk of exceeding a threshold. If the true value
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of this risk can be captured with some confidence, then a more in-
formed decision on the actions to be taken can be made. On the
other hand, since the true nature of the interdependencies be-
tween the hazards’ effects cannot be fully specified, a better
assumption than independence is ‘‘no assumption at all”. The met-
ric proposed is an envelope with bounds MinRISK and MaxRISK,
respectively the minimum and maximum probabilities of a fused
expectation of casualties exceeding the safety threshold. Therefore,
MinRISK ¼ min probðECFUS P ECTRESHÞ
MaxRISK ¼ max probðECFUS P ECTRESHÞ
ð2Þ
where ECTRESH is a safety threshold, ECFUS is the fused expectation of
casualties of the three hazards identified earlier (when no assump-
tion is made on the nature of the interdependencies).
Therefore, from a decision maker perspective, with this metric,
the decision to be taken is shifted from being based upon a subjec-
tive assessment of the size of the uncertainty around the mean to
being based upon a range of probabilities of exceeding a pre-spec-
ified safety threshold. To illustrate, suppose ECTRESH = 3 for a partic-
ular launch, indicating that the launch will be aborted if the
expected number of casualties is greater or equal to 3. Then our
metric, which combine the effect of all the hazards, may generate
an estimate of the form
MinRISK ¼ min probðECFUS P 3Þ ¼ 25%
MaxRISK ¼ max probðECFUS P 3Þ ¼ 67%
ð3Þ
The decision maker will then have to decide whether this risk is
acceptable. With current practices, such clear measures cannot be
obtained.
3.1. Methodology
Over the past two decades, interest in information fusion – also
known as multi-source data fusion – has grown tremendously. It is
widely used in various US Department of Defense (DoD) research
areas such as automated target recognition, battlefield surveil-
lance, and guidance and control of autonomous vehicles. However,
it is being used increasingly in other, non-DoD applications. Hall
and Llinas [13] define data fusion as ‘‘. . .a formal framework in
which are expressed means and tools for the alliance of data orig-
inating from different sources, with the aim of obtaining informa-
tion of greater quality. . .”. In the context of range safety, the greater
quality may refer to the complete (all hazards being considered),
more realistic (no assumption of independence) and more useful
(a calculated range of risk) nature of the safety metric proposed
here. The data originating from different sources are the expecta-
tion of casualties (the data) as estimated independently by each
hazard (the sources).
Several information fusion frameworks have been developed
and can be found in the literature. Established ones include, among
others, Bayesian Inference [14], Dempster-Shafer theory [15], Dis-
tributed Envelope Determination (DEnv) [16] and the Transferable
Belief Model [17]. We will discuss here Distributed Envelope
Determination, and how it can be used to estimate the metric
being proposed. It is worth noting that Dempster-Shafer theory1
could be have been used as well [18]. However, we believe DEnv
to be more intuitive and therefore more effective in illustrating the
proposition being made.
3.1.1. Implementation of DEnv
DEnv is a convolution-based method for determining depen-
dency bounds of binary arithmetic operations on random variables
(RVs), even when their corresponding cumulative distribution
functions (cdfs) may be uncertain. This is in contrast to Monte Car-
lo simulation which assumes that the distributions of the random
variables are known. Furthermore, in cases where the dependency
relationship between the RVs is not specified, DEnv can produce
bounds which include the entire range of possible dependencies.
To implement this method through decision fusion, we treat the
expectation of casualties generated by the hazard models as RVs.
We therefore define ECB, ECD and ECG as the expectations of casual-
ties’ random variables generated respectively from blast propaga-
tion, debris fragmentation and gas dispersion. Empirical
distributions of the RVs mentioned above (ECB, ECD, and ECG) can
be generated by simulating different vehicle breakup scenarios,
as illustrated in Section 4. The distributions are then used as inputs
to DEnv, and fused as explained below.
Suppose ECFUS = ECi + ECj where ECi and ECj are RVs – correspond-
ing to the effects of two known hazards – following two empirical
distributions. These distributions can be represented in a ‘‘joint
distribution tableau” in order to (1) determine (if the 2 RVs are
considered independent of each other) or (2) bound (if the 2 RVs
are dependent of each other) their joint distribution (i.e. ECFUS).
Using interval-based arithmetic,2 a ‘‘joint distribution tableau”
can conveniently display the relationship between a joint distribu-
tion and its associated marginals (Table 1). If ECi and ECj are inde-
pendent, then the joint probabilities are obtained by multiplying
the marginals (e.g. p11 = pj1  pi1). However, if ECi and ECj are depen-
dent, and the nature of that dependency is unknown, then the joint
probabilities cannot be determined. In such case, DEnv makes an
inference about the joint distribution by identifying the possible
range of the joint probabilities. In other words, for every value of
the random variable ECFUS, the interest is in finding the minimum
and maximum cumulative probabilities possible. For example, gi-
ven Table 1, if we are interested in eCFUS 6 0.057, then3 only the
cells in bold should be considered.
Among those cells, the maximum cumulative probability at
0.057 can be found by maximizing the sum of the probabilities of
the cells in which eCFUS 6 0.057 may occur. On the other hand,
the minimum cumulative probability at 0.057 is found by minimiz-
ing the sum of the probabilities of the cells in which eCFUS 6 0.057
must occur. As Table 1 imposes the following constraints, Row con-
straints:
P3
b¼1pab ¼ paj for a = 1–3, Column constraints:P3
a¼1pab ¼ pib for b = 1–3, finding the maximum and minimum
cumulative probabilities for eCFUS 6 0.057 becomes equivalent to
solving a set of two optimization questions, which can be done
through linear programming (LP):
Maximize ðp11 þ p21 þ p31 þ p12 þ p22 þ p32Þ
subject to
P3
b¼1
pab ¼ paj for a ¼ 1—3
P3
a¼1
pab ¼ pib for b ¼ 1—3
pij P 0
ð4:aÞ
Minimize ðp11 þ p12Þ
subject to
P3
b¼1
pab ¼ paj for a ¼ 1—3
P3
a¼1
pab ¼ pib for b ¼ 1—3
pij P 0
ð4:bÞ
1 Bayesian Inference requires a full specification of the joint probability between
the different sources, rendering it impractical for this application.
2 In interval analysis, if Z = X + Ywhere X is the interval [i, j] and Y the interval [k, l],
then Z is the interval [i + k, j + l].
3 eCFUS is a sample value of the random variable ECFUS.
S.N. Sala-Diakanda et al. / Information Fusion 11 (2010) 365–373 367
Therefore, for each value of ECFUS, two LP problems must be
solved. Connecting all the cumulative probabilities produces amax-
imum and a minimum curve within which all the possible cumula-
tive distribution functions of ECFUS must belong. DEnv’s approach
solves the two LP problems through the transportation simplex
method (TSM). However, since TSM requires transportation tab-
leaus, joint distribution tables such as Table 1 must be transformed.
This is accomplished by treating the marginals ECi and ECj as desti-
nations and sources respectively, and setting both the total supply
and the total demand equal to 1. Also, since the objective of the TSM
is to minimize the objective function, a goal of maximization (as in
Eq. (4.a)), must be transformed into one of minimization (Eq. (5)).
This is achieved by setting the costs Cab’s of the cells contributing
to the objective function to 1. Table 2 is the resulting transporta-
tion tableau. On the other hand, when the objective is to minimize,
(as in Eq. (4.b)), the Cab’s are set to 1 in those cells in which the event
eCFUS 6 0.057 must occur (C11 and C12 in Table 2). In both cases, the
costs of non-contributing cells are set to 0.
Minimizeðp11  p21  p31  p12  p22  p32Þ
subject to
P3
b¼1
pab ¼ paj for a ¼ 1—3
P3
a¼1
pab ¼ pib for b ¼ 1—3
C11 ¼ C21 ¼ C31 ¼ C12 ¼ C22 ¼ C32 ¼ 1
other Cab ¼ 0; pij P 0
ð5Þ
In order to generate themaximum andminimum cdf curves, one
must know, for each point eCFUS on the domain of ECFUS, the highest
and lowest cumulative probabilities (the extremes) that are possi-
ble for any dependency relationship between the data sources ECi
and ECj. Since the extremes have staircase shapes, one only needs
to select the eCFUS at which discontinuities occur. It can be shown
[16] that the discontinuities only occur at the endpoints of the
intervals eCFUSij of ECFUS. Given those facts, the number of candidate
points eCFUS (and therefore, the number of LP problems needed to be
solved) can be significantly reduced. Fig. 1 illustrates the metric
being proposed, once the two cdf curves have been determined.
4. Experimental investigation: modeling range safety for an
inland spaceport
Simulating (and analyzing the effects of) launch vehicles’ break-
ups may be performed using the routine shown in Fig. 2. The steps
are (1) selecting and modeling a geographical area of interest, (2)
constructing sheltering and exposure models for that area, (3) sim-
ulating vehicle breakups at several state vectors, (4) calculating
hazard-specific expectation of casualties from the spatial distribu-
tions of the hazards generated, (5) fusing those expectations, and
(6) mapping the fused outputs to geographic locations (for exam-
ple as high, medium or low risk areas).
The fused outputs may then be represented as map layers on a
geographical information system (GIS) system. Of the six steps
mentioned above, steps 1, and 3–6 are the most important to illus-
trate the merit of the new metric and fusion scheme being pro-
posed over current practices. Therefore, sheltering and exposure
data was not considered.
4.1. Spaceport site selection
The spaceport site was selected to reflect the growing interest,
mentioned earlier, from some inland federal states in owning a
spaceport. Understanding the implications of locating a spaceport
inland is of critical importance since, from a risk estimation stand-
point, a vehicle breaking over land may generate a larger risk to the
public than a vehicle breaking over the oceans. For our simulation,
we selected Clinton-Sherman Spaceport of Oklahoma (35.34N,
99.20E) located in Northwest Washita Census County Division
(CCD). Clinton-Sherman Spaceport has been licensed by the FAA
as a space tourism launch site since June 2006 [19].
4.2. Modeling of the complex terrain
An important factor, particularly in the dispersion of toxic gases,
is the complexity of the terrain. AERMAP [20], the terrain prepro-
cessor system from the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), was used to model the complex terrain around Clinton-Sher-
man Spaceport. AERMAP processes commercially available digital
Table 1
Joint distribution tableau of ECFUS = ECi + ECj with cells contributing to the objective function identified.
Intervals and associated probabilities ECj
ECFUS e [0.021, 0.055] p11 = ? ECFUS e [0.025, 0.057] p12 = ? ECFUS e [0.027, 0.06] p13 = ? ECj e [0.03, 0.06] p1j = 0.3
ECFUS e [0.031, 0.065] p21 = ? ECFUS e [0.035, 0.067] p22=? ECFUS e [0.037, 0.07] p23 = ? ECj e [0.06, 0.12] p2j = 0.2
ECFUS e [i1 + k3, j1 + l3] p31 = ? ECFUS e [0.065, 0.127] p32 = ? ECFUS e [0.067, 0.13] p33 = ? ECj e [0.03, 0.06] p3j = 0.3
ECi ECi e [i1, j1] pi1 = 0.25 ECi e [i2, j2] pi2 = 0.5 ECi e [i3, j3] pi3 = 0.25
Table 2
Transportation tableau for maximum cumulative probability at eCFUS 6 0.057. Cells where this condition may occur are assigned a cost of 1.
Source Destination Supply
ECi e [0.001, 0.005] ECi e [0.005, 0.007] ECi e [0.007, 0.01]
ECj e [0.02, 0.05] ECFUS e [0.021, 0.055] p11 = ? C11 = 1 ECFUS e [0.025, 0.057] p12 = ? C12 = 1 ECFUS e [0.027, 0.06] p13 = ? C13 = 1 0.5
ECj e [0.03, 0.06] ECFUS e [0.031, 0.065] p21 = ? C21 = 1 ECFUS e [0.035, 0.067] p22 = ? C22 = 1 ECFUS e [0.037, 0.07] p23 = ? C23 = 1 0.3
ECj e [.06, 0.12] ECFUS e [i1 + k3, j1 + l3] p31 = ? C31 = 0 ECFUS e [0.065, 0.127] p32 = ? C32 = 0 ECFUS e [0.067, 0.13] p33 = ? C33 = 0 0.2
Demand 0.25 0.5 0.25 1
Fig. 1. Curves bounding the true cdf of the fused output ECFUS.
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elevation data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
and other commercial sites to produce terrain elevation data files.
A total of 128, 7.5-min digital elevation model (DEM) files were
processed, covering an area of approximately 200 km (in the
east–west direction) by 95 km (in the north–south direction). Since
AERMAP also requires a modeling domain inside the area covered
by the DEM files, we defined – in UTM-14N coordinates – a domain
with the southwest corner at 470,000E and 3,895,000N, and the
northeast corner of the domain at 660,000E and 3,965,000N. The
area and domain of study (Fig. 3) were designed to cover Clin-
ton-Sherman Spaceport and a large area around the vehicle launch
trajectory, so as to accommodate the potentially large hazard im-
pact areas, given the weather conditions at the time of launch.
4.3. Simulation of vehicle breakup
NASA’s Space Shuttle was selected as the launch vehicle for this
study. Although Clinton-Sherman Spaceport may never be used for
launching vehicles of this size, the Space Shuttle was selected for
the availability of historical data. Using data from three Space
Shuttle missions – STS-114, STS-115 and STS-121 – high-order
polynomial equations for the vehicle altitude, downrange, velocity
magnitude and direction as functions of time were derived using
commercial statistical software. These equations were then used
to simulate 89 different breakups scenarios, spanning from time
t = +0 s (breakup on the launch pad) to time t = +130 s (breakup
at boosters’ separation). In order to eliminate the effect of the prob-
ability of occurrence of each breakup on the comparative analysis
between the risk estimates generated with the proposed approach,
and those generated with current practices, all the simulated
breakups were assigned the same probability of occurrence. For
each breakup, the following parameters were monitored: Vehicle
altitude and downrange, vehicle speed and direction, vehicle
weight, amount of solid propellant remaining, and amount of
liquid propellant remaining.
Along with meteorological data, such as wind direction and
speed, the parameters above were used to simulate pieces of debris
trajectories, blast wave propagation, and toxic gases dispersion.
Meteorological data were collected from theWill RogersWorld Air-
port station in Oklahoma City (station #13967), located at latitude
35.389N and longitude 97.600W [21]. The data was collected for
the year 1989, at the time the latest available dataset for hourly data
in the area. The meteorological wind data was processed through
AERMET, a processor used by the EPA and the launches were simu-
lated to occur on March 15 at 10:00 AM in the morning, local time.
The fragmentation process and the estimation of debris trajec-
tories were performed according to similar modeling practices as
described in the literature [22]. Blast wave propagation analysis
was carried using the TNT equivalency method [23]. Modeling of
toxic gases dispersion was performed in AERMOD, an EPA-recom-
mended state-of-the-art dispersion model for determining compli-
ance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). In
addition, the gas dispersion modeling followed NASA recom-
mended procedure as published here [24]. Table 3 lists some of
the critical parameters used and assumptions made in the model-
ing effort of hazards’ effect.
Fig. 2. Launch vehicle breakup simulation routine.
Fig. 3. CCD terrain elevations around Clinton-Sherman spaceport (Displayed in ArcMap).
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4.4. Calculating hazard-specific expectation of casualties
In order to estimate the risk generated by each hazard, pop-
ulation distribution data is needed. LandScanTM 2005 dataset
[26], a worldwide population database developed by Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) can be used to provide this data. It
is a population database compiled on a 3000  3000 latitude/longi-
tude grid which includes, for each country, the best available
census counts at sub-national levels. For each hazard, a map is
developed to construct an empirical distribution of the expected
number of casualties, given the simulated launch trajectory. Each
map is made of three layers: (1) a layer for the CCDs around
Clinton-Sherman Spaceport, (2) a layer for population count
and geographical distribution in each CCD, and (3) a layer repre-
senting the spatial distribution of the hazards features (debris
fields, gas clouds where the concentration threshold has been
exceeded and, blast waves where the overpressure threshold
has been exceeded).
Fig. 4 shows the map developed for the debris dispersion
analysis. Debris fields are the largest – sometimes spanning sev-
eral CCDs – for breakups occurring later in flight, at higher alti-
tudes. It can also be seen, through the overlapping fields of all
breakup scenarios that some CCDs are more likely to be severely
impacted than others. Merging together, for a specific hazard, all
the areas considered at risk results in a map such as Fig. 5. Fig. 5
provides a close-up around Clinton-Sherman, showing three
non-congruent hazards’ areas for a Space Shuttle launch under
the flight and meteorological conditions mentioned in Section
4.3.
Gas, as opposed to debris, is dominant in early breakups,
when vehicles have large amount of propellant remaining. On
the other hand, high overpressure blasts only occur very early
in the launch phase,4 as indicated by the non-concentric blast
waves on the map. Therefore, in light of the spatio-temporal nat-
ure of the estimated areas at risk, one should not only be inter-
ested in an estimate of the overall risk (risk of a flight), but also
in assessing how this risk may be distributed among the geo-
graphic entities (risk in each CCD). This latter assessment is
needed in two critical areas: (1) the evaluation of the suitability
of a spaceport location, and (2) the planning and design of risk
mitigation procedures.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Assessing the overall risk
Since blast waves and toxic gases are continuous features, the
reasonable assumption was made that anyone inside their impact
areas will be considered a casualty. The estimated probability dis-
tributions of expected casualties for the gas and blast are shown
in Table 4. On the other hand, the pieces of debris being discrete fea-
tures, it is unreasonable to assume that everyone inside a given
debris area – a person exposed – is automatically a casualty (after
the Space Shuttle Columbia breakup, although more than 80,000
pieces of debris fell over more than 10 counties, resulting in a large
number of people exposed, therewas no casualty reported [25]). In-
stead, the number of casualties due to debris was determined by
treating the probability of being a casualty as an outcome of a Ber-
noulli trial. Two inputs necessary for the implementation of this ap-
proachwere the distribution of the areas of the debris fields and the
frequency distribution of the number of people exposed in them.
These inputs were determined from data contained in Fig. 4.
The new metric requires the outputs of the Tables 4 and 5 to be
fused. It also focuses on the probability of exceeding (or not
exceeding) an expectation of casualty threshold – which needs to
be set – rather than on a mean expected value. Table 6 shows
the risk of incurring at least and at most 5 casualties. The estimates
of each hazard and of their combination under the assumption of
independence are also listed. For these last cases, the probabilities
(for ‘‘at least” and ‘‘at most”) are simply the complements of each
other. However, this is not the case with the proposed metric (fu-
sion upper and lower bounds) as the fusion generates overlapping
intervals (Fig. 1).
The overall risk of incurring at least 5 casualties is anywhere be-
tween 60% and 80%, while the risk of observing at most 5 casualties
is estimated to be at least 19% and at most 40%. Similarly, the over-
all risk of incurring at least 1 casualty could be as high as 100%
while the probability of no casualty is at most 40% (not shown in
Table). Therefore, with this new metric, two questions to be asked
could be ‘‘Is the maximum probability of incurring no casualty too
low?” or ‘‘Is the minimum probability of incurring at least 5 casu-
alties too high?” Only with the proposed metric can such questions
be answered.
Since the independent combination of the hazards’ estimates is
actually a special case of fusion (one in which the hazards’ esti-
mates are considered independent of each other), its estimates will
always fall between the two fusion bounds. And by providing a sin-
gle value for the risk, both the individual hazards estimates and the
estimate obtained from the assumption of independence will al-
ways be either pessimistic or optimistic estimates of the true risk.
For example, while MinRISK (EC 6 ECTRESH = 1) is as low as 0%, the
independent fusion predicts this risk to be around 22%. The debris
on the other hand predicts that the risk is more than 99%. Both the
independent and the debris cases provide estimates which can
Table 3
Parameters and assumptions of hazards’ effect modeling.
Parameters Value
 Initial vehicle trajectory and state
vectors
 From historical data
 Debris generated at breakup  80,000a
 Groups of debris with similar ballistic
characteristics
 100
 Wind effect on debris trajectory  Once debris has reached
terminal velocity [24]
 Uncertainties considered in debris
trajectory
 Real time state vector
uncertainty
 Fragment initial velocity
uncertainty
 Drag uncertainty
 Lift uncertainty
 Wind uncertainty
 Uncertainty not considered in debris
trajectory
 Tumble turn malfunctionsb
 Gas dispersion  25,000 receptors
 Toxicant modeled  Hydrochloric acid (HCl)
 Average concentration  4-h time average
 Toxicant 4-h time average
concentration threshold value
 5 ppm (7.46 mg/m3)
 Blast overpressure thresholdc  10 kPa
Considered only cases where the debris fields produced by the solid rocket booster
(SRBs) significantly overlap each other.
Percentage of all the fragments produced which are also burning propellant was
assumed to be proportional to the volume of the two SRBs with respect to the
complete Space Shuttle vehicle (orbiter, external tank and the 2 SRBs).
a Similar to Space Shuttle Columbia breakup estimates [24].
b This uncertainty requires extensive and detailed information that could not be
obtained for the vehicle being modeled.
c Corresponds to an approximate scaled distance of 9 m/kg1/3. This overpressure
is the approximate value at which eardrum rupture – the first type of damage to an
individual – occurs.
4 High overpressure blasts were found to reach the ground only for breakup that
occur less than 15 s after launch.
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clearly be considered optimistic, as they negate the real possibility
of incurring at least one 1 casualty.
5.2. Assessing the geographic distribution of the overall risk
As mentioned earlier, strong consideration should be given to
assessing how the overall risk is distributed among the geographic
entities. The cumulative hazard impact areas as shown in Fig. 5 can
be used along with population information to generate, for each
CCD impacted, casualty distributions similar to those of Tables 4
and 5 and results similar to Table 6. However, as the interest is
on the geographic distribution of the overall risk, it is more practi-
cal and intuitive to generate maps that visually represent that
distribution.
Fig. 5. Non-congruent areas at risk around Clinton-Sherman airport as estimated by the three hazards (population layer removed for clarity, actual spaceport location is
inside blast waves).
Fig. 4. Oklahoma CCDs and population distribution, and overlapping debris fields, along the vehicle trajectory. A probability distribution of the expectation of number of
casualties from a debris standpoint can be derived.
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For example, suppose the interest is in detecting those areas
where the probability of observing less than 3 casualties is more
than 95%. In other words, if it was previously determined that
the expectation of casualty threshold should be 3 casualties then
the interest is in identifying those areas that can be deemed safe.
The answer is shown in Fig. 6, with the CCDs highlighted being
those that satisfy the above condition. To generate this map, the
lower bound (MinRISK) of the fusion was used. Alternatively, if the
interest is in identifying those areas where the probability of
observing more than 3 casualties is at least 10%, Fig. 7 will be gen-
erated. To generate this map, the upper bound (MaxRISK) of the fu-
sion was used.
6. Additional discussion
Despite the virtues illustrated in this paper of a fusion-based
metric, a more robust statistical comparative analysis is necessary
to establish its apparent superiority over EC. The analysis could in-
volve using Clinton-Sherman Spaceport to compare (1) each indi-
vidual hazard estimate or (2) the independent combination of
the hazards’ estimates with one of the bounds (upper or lower)
of the fusion estimates. Which bound would be used for a specific
comparison would depend on the objective of the analysis. Addi-
tionally, such analysis would also serve to identify the boundaries
Fig. 6. Geographic distribution of prob (EC 6 3)P 0.95.
Table 4
Probability distribution of debris casualties.
Gas casualties Blast casualties
ECD Probability ECD Probability
P < P <
0 1 0.22727 0 1 0.96591
1 10 0.17045 1 10 0.01136
. . . . . . . . . 10 20 0.02273
. . . . . . . . .
1100 1300 0.06818
Table 5
Probability distribution of debris casualties.
ECD Probability
P <
0 1 9.9367E  01
1 2 6.1619E  03
. . . . . . ...
8 9 1.1227E  15
9 – 0.0000E + 00
Table 6
Events: observing at least and at most 5 casualties.
Estimator Estimate ECTRESH
At least At most
Fusion lower bound MinRISK 0.602 0.193
Fusion upper bound MaxRISK 0.807 0.398
Independent prob(EC  ECTRESH) 0.611 0.389
Debris 0.000 1.000
Gas 0.773 0.227
Blast 0.034 0.966
 = {> if ‘‘at least” and 6 if ‘‘at most”}.
Fig. 7. Geographic distribution of prob (EC > 3)P 0.1.
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– if any – within which this superiority remains statistically signif-
icant, thereby providing valuable insight on the domain over which
use of the information-fusion-based metric should be considered
critical. The details of the analysis however, given its length and
complexity, will be discussed in a future article.
7. Conclusion
Space launch risk safety is a very complex endeavor; one de-
fined by intricate interactions between man, system and machine.
In this paper, a review of the state of art in space launch safety was
provided. The issues related to the mean collective risk to the gen-
eral public as a safety metric were exposed, as they promote a risk
avoidance rather than risk management philosophy to safety. A
new, information-fusion-based metric, one that focuses on the
probability of exceeding (or not exceeding) a pre-specified ex-
pected casualty threshold, was proposed. A detailed case study
was presented to illustrate its derivation, and its merits in terms
of the quantity and quality of information it generates. Although
some assumptions were made in the case study, such as the inde-
pendence of the probability of failure of the launch vehicle from
the phase of flight, or the use of a vehicle as large as the Space
Shuttle from an inland spaceport, the study clearly demonstrated
the virtues of a fusion-based metric over the traditional expecta-
tion of casualties. Additionally, since the new metric uses EC distri-
butions, its appeal is further enhanced, as it can be easily and
quickly adopted, thereby providing a significant first step toward
improving space launch risk safety.
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